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Passwords and Keys Under the DMCA:
A Call for Clarification from the Courts or
Congress
LINDSEY M. SHINN*

INTRODUCTION: THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT

Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"
or the "Act") in 1998 to prevent the piracy of copyrighted works and to
provide copyright owners with an incentive to develop new business
models that would make these works available in digital form.' The
DMCA provides copyright holders with three causes of action
surrounding the circumvention of two types of "technological protection
measures" (TPMs) that guard their works: the Act prohibits (i) the
circumvention of "access" controls, and (ii) the trafficking in devices that
are primarily designed to circumvent access or "rights" controls
(measures that protect the specific bundle of rights encompassed by
copyright).2 Congress' purported purpose was to maintain the balance of
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2009. The Author
would like to thank Professor Margreth Barrett, Lonnie, and Corbett for their comments on her drafts,
the Volume 6o staff of the Hastings Law Journal for their careful eyes and expert corrections, and
Roxane, Max, and Samir for their support.
i. See Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1I35 (2003); Jane C.
Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of an Access Right in U.S.
Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYR. Soc'y i, 124 (2003).
2. First, "[n]o person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to
a work protected under this title." 17 U.S.C. § I2os(a)(i)(A) (2oo6). Second:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any
technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this
title;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected
under this title[.)
Id. § 12o1(a)(2)(A)-(B). Third, and finally:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any
technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing protection
afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright
[1173]
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copyright, between protecting artists' works and encouraging further
creativity, as we advance into the digital age. Commentators have since
debated whether that goal has actually been achieved. Some believe the
DMCA is beneficial and necessary to spur the availability of copyrighted
works in digital formats and on the Internet.' Critics of the DMCA,
however, argue the statute actually upset the balance of copyright, tilting
it unfairly in favor of copyright owners.'
Though the legislative history of the Act mentions the Internet and
content media as key concerns in the battle against piracy,' whether or
not Congress intended it, once implemented, the DMCA proved to be
relevant in a whole host of other areas. For example, the broadest
question arising in the context of section 1201(a)(i) is whether Congress
intended to prohibit circumvention of TPMs only when it then leads to
the possibility of copyright violation,6 or whether it created a new right of
"access" separate and apart from the Copyright Act itself.7 In the case of
electronics parts embedded with copyrightable computer code, courts
such as the Federal Circuit in Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink
Technologies, Inc., and the Sixth Circuit in Lexmark International,Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., recognize that Congress did not intend
for the DMCA to affect the aftermarket for spare parts. 8 These courts
have agreed that with respect to products such as garage door openers
and printers, plaintiffs should not be able to obtain a monopoly on
secondary parts simply because they are partially comprised of
electronics that communicate with each other through "handshake"
methods that merely resemble TPMs.9
Courts have been fairly clear about where and how they believe the
DMCA applies. However, these decisions often seem outcome
owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof; [or]
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a
right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof[.]
Id. § 120I(b)(A)-(B).
3. Jane C. Ginsburg, Legal Protection of Technological Measures Protecting Works of
Authorship: InternationalObligationsand the U.S. Experience, 29 COLUM. J.L. &ARTs 11, 26 (2005).
4. See, e.g., R. Anthony Reese, Will MergingAccess Controlsand Rights Controls Undermine the
Structure of Anticircumvention Law?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 619 (2003); Jerome H. Reichman et al.,

A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected
Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981 (2007); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and
the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 519 (1999).

5. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § I2A.02(A) (2oo8).
6. See Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
7. Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); Ginsburg, supra note I.
However, this question is beyond the scope of this Note.
8. See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004);
Chamberlain,381 F.3d at 1178.
9. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 53o; Chamberlain,381 F.3d at 1199-1201.
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determinative in the closer cases, based upon who is doing the
circumventing and for what purpose. For example, when the use of a
device is clearly directed toward accessing or copying unpaid-for
copyrighted works, such as movies and musical recordings, courts tend to
hold that the device circumvents in violation of sections 1201(a)(2) and
1201(b)(I).' ° Conversely,

Lexmark and Chamberlain held that the

DMCA did not apply in the aftermarket-parts context." However, some
of the cases that are less obviously circumvention often skip crucial parts
of the analysis in explaining exactly how and why the conduct at issue
offends the circumvention provisions of section i201.2 This Note
contends that many of these decisions make serious logical reasoning
errors in attributing DMCA liability to defendant conduct when
compared to the text of the statute. This has led to inconsistency across
the broad spectrum of DMCA decisions.
This Note specifically addresses the courts' treatment of the DMCA
in the gray area of "passwords" or "keys" in the narrow class of cases
that I will refer to as "password" cases. Here, courts and commentators
often split over when the application of a legitimate, copyright-holderissued password or key to a TPM constitutes impermissible
circumvention under section I201.' This issue raises a whole host of
questions. When, if ever, does the use of a password constitute
"circumvention" under the statute? Does this use hinge on the
"authority" of the copyright holder? How does one know when such
authority exists? What if a valid password is obtained and applied by
someone who is not explicitly "authorized"? Can a more technologically
sophisticated software code "key" ever constitute a permissible
"password" under the statute?
In discussing passwords and keys used to move past TPMs, this Note
is primarily concerned with the definition and application of the phrase
to "circumvent a technological measure." 4 Under section 1201(a)(3)(A),
it means "to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted
work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a
technological measure, without the authority of the copyright owner."' 5
In section 1201(b)(2)(A), the definition of circumvention is slightly
so. See infra Parts I, III.
i i.See infra Part II.
i2.See, e.g., Davidson & Assocs. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1184 (E.D. Mo.
2004); 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc., 3o7 F. Supp. 2d io85 (N.D. Cal. 2004); see also discussion

infra Part i1.
13. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 27-28 ("This interpretation is questionable.... Entry of
the password 'deactivates' the measure that restricts access; if the password is employed by an
unauthorized user, then the deactivation will not have occurred with the copyright owner's authority."
(citations omitted)). However, this is a very subjective definition of authorized.
14. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A), (b)(2)(A) (20o6).
S. Id. § 1201(a)(3)(A).
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different: "avoiding, bypassing, removing, deactivating, or otherwise
impairing a technological measure.' 6 It is important that the latter says
nothing about the "authority of the copyright owner," and the former
does not define authority at all.
The first Part of this Note will address the clearer types of cases
covered by the DMCA-the hacking and intent to circumvent cases on
one side and the replacement electronics parts cases on the other. Next,
the discussion will delve into the password cases, which constitute a gray
area of uses that are not obviously circumvention, but are often held to
be. Described the right way, many more "applications of information" to
TPMs can constitution proper "access" than the courts currently allow or
that Congress may have intended. 7 However, failure to acknowledge this
ambiguity leaves us with an illogical and inconsistent interpretation of
the circumvention provisions of the DMCA.
The final Part of this Note suggests that Congress or the courts
should better define the definition of "circumvention" and what
constitutes "authority" under section 1201. This process becomes
challenging when considering the differing infrastructures upon which
the DMCA sits. The current world of the First Sale Doctrine gives one
with title to a legal copy of a copyrighted work the right to do what one
wishes with it.'8 However, some argue Congress endorsed the evolving
trend of "renting" works to consumers through pay-per-use licensing
agreements, which are designed to make works more freely and cheaply
available.' 9 Under this scheme, the First Sale Doctrine does not apply.
With these two models in mind, should the fact that one owns or
possesses the work constitute authority of the copyright owner? Yes,
under the first model, but not under the second; for if you possess the
work but only purchased a limited-use version, you only have limited
"authorization" to access it. Society is likely at a place between these two
models, and therefore the DMCA and its current definitions are an
uncomfortable fit. Congress should reevaluate its one-size-fits-all model.

16. Id. § 1201(b)(2)(A).
17. Id. § 1201(a)(3)(B).
I8.Id. § tog ("[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or
any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell
or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord."); Pamela Samuelson, The
Copyright Grab, WIRED MAG., Jan. 1996, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.ol/
white.paper-pr.html.
19. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the "Digital Millennium," 23 COLUM.VLA J.L. &ARTs 137, 142 (1999).
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I.

BACKGROUND: CASES THE

DMCA

WAS INTENDED

TO ADDRESS

With the advent of Napster and other online file sharing sites, it
became easy for consumers to obtain copies of copyrighted work for
"free."2 In response, copyright owners began putting technological
"locks" on their works. The DMCA was intended to be another tool to
prevent copyright infringement in the digital environment, or more
simply put, "piracy.'' I One of the ways it does this is to make it a
violation to "manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or
otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component,
or part thereof" that enables someone to circumvent a technological
measure that protects access to a copyrighted work or a right of
copyright.2 The idea is that a ban on providing circumvention devices
reduces their availability on the market, thus making it more difficult to
gain unauthorized (i.e., unpaid) access to, and to infringe upon,
copyrighted works. 3
One of the most notorious areas of litigation under the DMCA
involves the DVD-content-protection program known as the Content
Scrambling System (CSS). A Norwegian programmer discovered a way
around it, calling his circumvention mechanism "DeCSS. 2 4 Litigation
ensued over the use of DeCSS, and whether the defendant's actions in
making it available encouraged copyright infringement. For example, the
court in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes found that DeCSS
circumvented CSS under the meaning of the circumvention provisions of
the DMCA 5 Defendants were found liable for trafficking because, by
their own admission, they posted DeCSS on their website, and its only
function was to circumvent CSS.26
The court further noted that "the availability of DeCSS on the
Internet effectively has compromised plaintiffs' system of copyright
protection for DVDs, requiring them either to tolerate increased piracy
or to expend resources to develop and implement a replacement system
unless the availability of DeCSS is terminated."27 The court analogized to
2o. See Aaron M. Bailey, Comment, A Nation of Felons?: Napster, the Net Act, and the Criminal
Prosecution of File-Sharing,50 AM. U. L. Rav. 473, 478-81 (2000).
21. Burk, supra note I.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 120i(a)(2), (b)(i).
23. Burk, supra note I, at 1135-36 ("The record suggests that the anticircumvention right was
intended by Congress as a shield rather than as a sword, intended as a means to prevent wholesale
misappropriation of copyrighted content, rather than as a means to extend content owners' exclusivity
to cover adjacent, uncopyrighted technologies.").
24. Id. at 1I12; see also Andy Patrizio, Why the DVD Hack Was a Cinch, WIRED MAo., Nov. 2,
1999, availableat http://www.wired.com/science/discoverieslnewsh 999/i 1/32263.
25. iiIF. Supp. 2d 294,318-I9 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 315.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6o: 1 173

"the publication of a bank vault combination in a national newspaper.
Even if no one uses the combination to open the vault, its mere
publication has the effect of defeating the bank's security system, forcing
the bank to reprogram the lock."2S
On appeal to the Second Circuit as Universal City Studios v. Corley,
the defendants argued, among other things, that "an individual who buys
a DVD has the 'authority of the copyright owner' to view the DVD, and
therefore is exempted from the DMCA pursuant to subsection
1201(a)(3)(A) when the buyer circumvents an encryption technology in
order to view the DVD on a competing platform."29 However, the court
rejected this argument, noting that subsection 1201(a)(3)(A) "exempts
from liability those who would 'decrypt' an encrypted DVD with the
authority of a copyright owner, not those who would 'view' a DVD with
the authority of a copyright owner," and that "Defendants offered no
evidence that the Plaintiffs have either explicitly or implicitly authorized
DVD buyers to circumvent encryption technology to support use on
multiple platforms. ' 3' This decision laid the groundwork for how courts
interpret the DMCA in the context of consumer media like CDs and
DVDs. However, the court failed to fully explain the notion of
"authorization" or how the defendants might have obtained it.
In the wake of Corley, another case arose that challenged the
legality of a device accused of circumventing CSS. 321 Studios v. MGM
Studios, Inc. claims to be an offshoot of the prior case, in that it addresses
the use of a program that could circumvent CSS, and basically follows
the Corley analysis.' In 321 Studios, plaintiff created a program called
"DVD-X Copy" which could read the content of a DVD encoded with
CSS and then copy it to a computer without the CSS encoding; this
allowed the content to be played on any media, but also to be copied.3"
Essentially, the program used a CSS "player key" and "publicly known
computer code" to decode CSS and access the data.33 Although one was
not supposed to be able to obtain a player key without entering into a
license agreement, the opinion does not say how defendants obtained a
copy. The copyright holders here successfully framed the issue as one of
authority under the CSS license agreement, as found by the court in
Reimerdes:

28. Id.
29. 273 F-3 d 429, 444 (2d Cir. 2001).
30. Id.
31. 307 F. Supp. 2d io85 (N.D. Cal. 2004). This Note challenges some of the reasoning in this
case. See infra Part IV.B.
32. 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1O89.

33. Id.
34. Id.
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[O]nly licensed DVD players can legally access the CSS keys in order
to play DVDs. See Universal Studios v. Reimerdes, iii F.Supp.2d at
317-318 ("One cannot gain access to a CSS-protected work on a DVD
without application of the three keys that are required by the software.
One cannot lawfully gain access to the keys except by entering into a
license with the DVD CCA under authority granted by the copyright
owners or by purchasing a DVD
player or drive containing the keys
35
pursuant to such a license.").
The court agreed with this argument, finding circumvention and violation
of the trafficking provisions in both section 120I(a)(2) and section
1201(b)(I) because, although the keys were valid, 321 Studios was not
authorized to use them, and thus, their use constituted circumvention.6

II.

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: THE "AFTERMARKET-PARTS"

CASES

Because computers are becoming increasingly ubiquitous in a
variety of household products, and because computer programs are
protected by copyright, litigation arose under the DMCA in the area of
component parts that use "authentication keys" or electronic
"handshakes" to communicate with the main product.37 In the Federal
Circuit cases of Chamberlain and Storage Technology Corp. v. Custom
Hardware Engineering & Consulting, Inc., and in the Sixth Circuit
decision in Lexmark, the plaintiffs sued parts makers under the DMCA,
claiming that defendants' use of their keys constituted circumvention of
their access and rights controls." Both circuits, however, found no
circumvention liability, and further rationalized that, in any case, the
DMCA was not meant to reach this area.39
The Sixth Circuit noted in Lexmark that because plaintiff had not
"directed any of its security efforts... to ensuring that its copyrighted
work ...cannot be read and copied," it could not claim to have put in
place a "technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under [the copyright statute]."*° Thus, the court highlighted the
need for the technological measure at issue to actually protect the
copyrighted work. Further, the Chamberlaincourt held that the DMCA
"prohibits only forms of access that bear a reasonable relationship to the

35. Id. at IO95 (citation omitted) (quoting Universal Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, iii F. Supp. 2d
294,317-t8 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).

36. Id. at io99.
37. NIMMER &NIMMER, supra note 5, § 12A.o6(C)(2).
38. Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F. 3 d 1307, 1310 (Fed.
Cir. 2005); Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 529 (6th Cir. 2004);
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3 d 1178, 1i85 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
39. Storage Tech., 421 F.3d at 1318; Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 549; Chamberlain,381 F.3 d at 1203-04.
For a discussion of the DMCA legislative history generally, see Chamberlain,381 F.3d at 193-9940. 387 F.3d at 549 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

118o
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protections that the Copyright Act otherwise affords copyright owners."'"
Thus, to demonstrate a violation of section 1201(a), a copyright owner
must prove that the alleged circumvention "infringes or facilitates
infringing a right protected by the Copyright Act."' The Federal Circuit
went even further in Storage Technology, disapproving of DMCA actions
not directly connected to copyright infringement.43
Another important aspect these three cases explore is the issue of
authorization. Professor Lipton noted that the Chamberlaincourt did not
accept that defendant's conduct was unauthorized, and instead
concluded that Chamberlain "implicitly authorize[d] its customers-to
whom it distributes its software embedded in the remote control-to
purchase any brand of transmitter that will open their garage door."'
Similarly, the court in Storage Technology explored the concept of
authorization, and the use of the DMCA to enforce contractual
provisions. There, defendant was a repair company that fixed data
storage libraries built by plaintiff.45 To perform its work the company had
to intercept maintenance error codes sent by plaintiff's data storage
software embedded in the system. 46 To successfully intercept the codes,
however, defendant's computers had to "override a password protection
scheme," which defendant accomplished simply by having its software
guess at the key until it found the right one.47 Plaintiff argued this was
foreclosed by the DMCA because it violated the initial sales contract. 4s
The Storage Technology court noted that "'uses' that violate a
license agreement constitute copyright infringement only when those
uses would infringe in the absence of any license agreement at all. ' 49 The
plaintiff sold physical tape libraries but only licensed the necessary
software." That license covered only the "functional code portions of the
software," which "specifically excludes the maintenance code.
However... [b]oth the functional and maintenance code are
automatically loaded into the RAM... upon startup, and copying the
entire code is necessary to activate and run the library."5' Storage
Technology argued that even if its customers were authorized to access
41. 381 F.3d at 1202.

Id. at i2O3 (emphasis added).
43. 421 F.3 d at 1318 ("To the extent that [defendant's] activities do not constitute copyright
infringement or facilitate copyright infringement, [plaintiff] is foreclosed from maintaining an action
under the DMCA.").
44. Jacqueline Lipton, The Law of Unintended Consequences: The Digital Millennium Act and
Interoperability,62 WASH. &LEE L. REv.487, 511 (2005).
45. Storage Tech., 421 F.3d at 1310.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1316.
5o. Id. at 1310.
51. Id.
42.
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the maintenance codes, its customers could not in turn authorize
defendants, because customers were not permitted to "sublicense, assign,
lease or permit another person to use" the codes." The court disagreed,
noting that other portions of the license agreements demonstrated "the
authorized use is tied to a particular machine, rather than a particular
person." 3 This is not dissimilar from the notion that a legitimately issued
password, even in the hands of someone other than to whom it was
originally issued, may use it without committing circumvention under
section 120I(a).
Proceeding to Storage Technology's DMCA claim, the court argued
that even when circumvention is found under the DMCA, "[a] court
must look at the threat that the unauthorized circumvention potentially
poses in each case to determine if there is a connection between the
circumvention and a right protected by the Copyright Act."54 Noting the
lack of copyright infringement here, and perhaps agreeing with
defendant that "it [was] implicitly authorized to copy the maintenance
code,"55 the court held that "[t]he activation of the maintenance code
may violate [Storage Technology's] contractual rights vis-A-vis its
customers, but those rights are not the rights protected by copyright law.
There is simply not a sufficient nexus between the rights protected by
copyright law and the circumvention of the [plaintiff's] system.""
As one group of commentators recently noted, "[t]he courts
ultimately decided these cases by permitting third-party suppliers of
parts or services to bypass the lock-out codes and provide competing
parts or services, notwithstanding.. . the DMCA. Judges in the lock-out
cases could not accept the unbalanced interpretation of section
1201 ... ."" However, other scholars argue that Congress did in fact
intend 120I(a) to be a new right of access; that by granting it "without
further requiring proof of a nexus between the circumvention and
infringement, Congress has permitted, indeed encouraged, copyright

52. Id. at I316 (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. Id. at 1316-17 ("[Storage Technology's] argument, however, ignores the rest of the license
agreement. The prohibition on third-party use of the code is modified by a later provision stating that
equipment owners 'may transfer possession of Internal Code only with the transfer of the Equipment
on which its use is authorized.' Additionally, the license grants the customer the use of the code for
'the sole purpose of enabling the specific unit of Equipment for which the Internal Code was
provided .... ' The clear implication of those sections is that the license is tied to the piece of
equipment on which the software resides. Thus, the authorized use is tied to a particular machine,
rather than a particular person." (alteration in original)).
54. Id. at 1319.
55. Id. at 1311.
56. Id. at 1319.
57. Reichman et al., supra note 4, at iot i (citation omitted).
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owners to create and control markets for their works that the traditional
exclusive rights under copyright would not secure.''..
III. THE GRAY AREA: PASSWORDS VERSUS KEYS
This brings us to a gray area of DMCA law: the use of a password or
key issued by the copyright holder, but in ways perhaps not
contemplated or preferred by the copyright holder. These cases force
courts to ask in a very specific way, what constitutes circumvention under
the DMCA? The three issues this Part will discuss are: (i) when the use
of a password or key is an act of circumvention, (2) when the user of a
password or key of valid provenance uses it without the authority of the
copyright owner, and (3) when the breach of a contract restriction
triggers a DMCA violation. This area is where courts have been the least
consistent in their interpretation of the DMCA, as these types of cases
seem to be caught in the middle between the after-market parts cases
like Chamberlainand the clear instances of hacking to circumvent access
or copy controls as in Corley. This Note posits that one of the reasons is
because neither Congress nor the courts have workably defined
"authorization" within the definition of circumvention under the
DMCA.
In the first case to address manually applied passwords under the
DMCA, I.M.S. Inquiry Management Systems. v. Berkshire Information
Systems., the defendant allegedly "obtained a user identification and
password issued to a third party" and "intentionally and without
authorization accessed I.M.S.'s e-Basket service, and gathered and
copied content therefrom."59 After noting that the DMCA covers both
actions
such
as
"decryption,
"technologically-sophisticated"
descrambling, deactivation and impairment" and the more "open-ended
and mundane" avoiding or bypassing, the court determined that
defendant's actions did not fit any of these definitions. 6 Consequently,
the court held that "[d]efendant did not surmount or puncture or evade
any technological measure to [access the websitel; instead, it used a
password intentionally issued by plaintiff to another entity" and thus did
not violate the DMCA.6'
While some scholars and practitioners have criticized I.M.S.," two
courts have followed the decision. In Egilman v. Keller & Heckman,
LLP, defendant law firm accessed plaintiff's password-protected website

58. Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 30.
59. 307 F. Supp. 2d 521, 523, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Whether accessing copyrighted work by

unauthorized use of an otherwise legitimate, owner-issued password qualifies
circumvention.., appears to be a question of first impression in this Circuit and in all others.").
6o. Id.at 532.
61. Id. at 532-33.

62. See, e.g.,
Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 27.

as
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in the course of litigation between its client and the plaintiff. 63 However,
rather than obtaining the username and password from a third party, the
defendants may simply have guessed the correct one. 64 In dismissing
Egilman's DMCA claim, the court stated that "I.M.S. was correctly
decided" and "not factually distinguishable."6 The court concluded that
"using a username/password combination as intended-by entering a
valid username and password, albeit without authorization- does not
constitute circumvention under the DMCA." 66 In Healthcare Advocates,
Inc. v. Harding, Early, Follmer, & Frailey, an even more recent case
citing I.M.S., the court noted that because there was essentially no
technological protection measure to be circumvented, "lack of
permission is not circumvention under the DMCA."'
All three courts characterized the actions of the defendants not as
circumventing, but as properly approaching the plaintiffs' TPM with a
key created by the plaintiffs themselves, and the courts stated that these
are not situations that the DMCA was intended to address. 6 These
decisions leave two possible ways to avoid liability under section 1201(a):
either (I) a person's activities do not constitute circumvention under the
statute (as in LM.S.); or (2) a person's activities may fit the definition of
the first part of circumvention (descrambling, decoding, avoiding,
bypassing, etc.), but because they are authorized to do so, it is not
circumvention.
Courts' analyses of the application of copyright-holder-generated
passwords and keys begin to falter in cases where the use of a password
comes in the more technically sophisticated guise of a software
"handshake" that differs from the aftermarket-part context. An example
is Davidson & Associates v. Internet Gateway, which involved
defendants' creation of a server that allowed the playing of a videogame
in an alternative "multiplayer" format online with other players but
without certain features inherent in the original, and in which some of
the players were not "authorized." ' Though the facts are complicated,
the three relevant pieces of software seem to be (I) the videogame itself,
purchased by and maintained by the user, (2) the Battle.net server which
was run and maintained by plaintiff Blizzard Games, and (3) the
bnetd.org server which was run and maintained by defendants,
63.
64.
website
65.

401 F. Supp. 2d IO5, lO8 (D.D.C. 2005).
The plaintiff was a professor at Brown University, and the username and password for the
were "brown" and "student," respectively. See id. at io8 n.4.
Id. at 113.

66. Id.
67. 497 F. Supp. 2d 627, 646 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
68. See id. at 644-45 (citing I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. Sys. v. Berkshire Info. Sys., 307 F. Supp. 2d 52I,
532-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)); Egilman, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 113-14 (same).
69. 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1168-74 (E.D. Mo. 2004), affd sub nom, Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung,
422 F.3d 63o (8th Cir. 2005).
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independently from plaintiff Blizzard." Because the Battle.net server and
the bnetd.org server ran completely independently of each other and did
not interact, the concern arose over the authorized use of the Battle.net
multiplayer mode within the user's copy of the videogame itself."
Defendants claimed they had rightfully purchased a copy of the
game, and therefore had the right to use it as they wished.' Plaintiff
argued that though defendants were authorized to play the game, they
did not have the authority to access the game's Battle.net mode via their
"fake" bnetd.org server.73 Essentially, the plaintiff asserted that it was
false to assume that "permission to access Battle.net mode via a
Battle.net server create[d] implied authority to access Battle.net mode
via a fake Battle.net server," here, bnetd.org.74 The court sided with the
plaintiff and found circumvention under the DMCA:
It is true the defendants lawfully obtained the right to use a copy of the
computer programs when they agreed to the EULAs [End User
License Agreements] and TOU [Terms of Use]. The statute, however,
only exempts those who obtained permission to circumvent the
technological measure, not everyone who obtained permission to use
the games and Battle.net. The defendants did not have the right to
access Battle.net mode using the bnetd[.org] emulator. Therefore,
defendants' access was without the authority of the copyright owner.75
This decision is counter-intuitive and quite possibly incorrect. 6
To explain why, we must return to the concept of authorization,
asking whether the authorization comes from the purchase of the game
or from the EULA. The purchaser of a Blizzard game might like to
access all of the features of a game, and might believe he has the ability
to do so as he wishes. Under a doctrine of first sale-type analysis, the
purchaser would be entitled to do whatever he wanted with his copy of
the game.77 But the doctrine only applies if the purchaser actually gains
title to his copy of the game, rather than a license."5 Moreover, the TOU
for Battle.net prohibits reverse engineering and the creation of other
emulators. 79 But there is nothing in the EULA that prohibits the use of
other emulators like bnetd.org.'O
70. See id. at i168-69, 1171-73.

71. Id. at I171-73.
72. Id. at I184.
73. Id.

74. Id.
75. Id. at 1185 (citation omitted).
76. "Given that the opinion as a whole construes breach of contract and anti-circumvention under
Section 1201, not copyright infringement under Section 5oi, it is difficult to resist the notion that a
breakdown of categories afflicts this opinion." NIMMER & NimMER, supra note 5, § 12A-04 (B)(I) n.44.2.

77. See 17 U.S.C. § 1o9 (2oo6) (codifying the doctrine of first sale).
78. Id.
79. Davidson & Assocs., 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1171.
8o. Unless it can be construed from the text "you may not, in whole or in part, copy, photocopy,
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However, the district court sided with the plaintiff who claimed
"defendants did not have authority to access Battle.net mode via a fake
Battle.net server."8 ' Thus, the contention is not that Battle.net was being
circumvented, but that the videogame's grant of access to the mode
within the game was circumvented. However, if the purchase of the
videogame constituted authorization to play it in whatever mode the
purchaser wanted, and the purchaser visited bnetd.org before agreeing to
the limiting TOU on the Battle.net site, then presumably the purchaser is
authorized to play the videogame in whatever mode he wants. Nimmer
notes that once individuals purchased lawful copies of the Blizzard
software they could use bnetd.org, but this "was galling to Blizzard,
which wanted them to log on solely through the instrumentality of its
own proprietary Battle.net. ' , 82 In that sense, this case is another example
of a plaintiff trying to control the downstream use of his product, similar
to the aftermarket-parts cases.
Furthermore, it seems that the district court and the Eighth Circuit
got the CD Key "handshake" protocol confused. The CD Key is
contained in the videogame, used by the Battle.net server to verify that it
is a legitimately purchased copy, and then allows the videogame to access
the multiplayer features of Battle.net.83 It is, to compare with LM.S., the
password that allows the individual user's copy of the videogame access
to the Battle.net server. It is backwards to say that a CD Key that comes
with every copy of the videogame software is also used to grant access to
a feature within that software itself. But even with that reasoning, the
purchaser has a legitimate CD Key, and therefore has the authority
vested in the CD Key to access the features of the software. Though
defendants may not have been authorized to reach out to other Blizzard
game owners and access their Battle.net modes, it is hard to see why
those same users, initiating contact with the bnetd.org server, could not
grant the bnetd.org server authorization to access their copy of the
videogame. Enforcement of any other agreements imposed as a result of
using the Battle.net service is purely contractual in nature, and should
not implicate the DMCA.84
reproduce, translate, reverse engineer, derive source code, modify, disassemble, decompile, create
derivative works based on the Program, or remove any proprietary notices or labels on the program
without the prior consent, in writing, of Blizzard." Id. at 117o-71 (footnotes omitted) (citation
omitted).
81. Id. at 1184.
82. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, § I2A.o6(C)(2)(c).

83. Davidson & Assocs., 334 F. Supp. 2d at II69.
84. The court also seems to make an erroneous statement: "It is undisputed that defendants
circumvented Blizzard's technological measure, the 'secret handshake' between Blizzard games and
Battle.net, that effectively controlled access to Battle.net mode." Id. at 1 184-85. That is not clear at all,
since defendants denied circumvention and only pled for section 1201(f) relief in the alternative. Id.
Furthermore, because bnetd.org did not communicate with Battle.net in the course of the
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Similarly, in the recent case of Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG
Technologies, Inc., plaintiff website operator and copyright owner
maintained a website with internal pages protected by a lock-out screen,
provided the authorized password to access these pages on the lock-out
screen itself, freely permitted the use of those internal pages by
individuals who accepted the Terms of Service agreement (TOS), and
only forbade its use by automated "robots" through that TOS5
Defendant created and sold a device that allowed customers to navigate
the pages automatically, facilitating faster ticket purchases than
ordinarily possible with a single person encountering the "CAPTCHA"
system. 86 The court took a creative route to imputing both section
1201(a) and (b) liability to RMG, finding that because users of the device
violated the TOS, when the users of RMG's program subsequently
navigated the webpages (necessarily copying them to RAM), they then
committed copyright infringement. The court further found that the
CAPTCHA device protected this right of reRroduction, which defendant
primarily intended his device to circumvent. Though defendant asserted
that "CAPTCHA is designed to regulate ticket sales, not to regulate
access to a copyrighted work" (or the right of reproduction), the court
rejected this argument without explanation."' Arguably, the purpose of
Ticketmaster's site is indeed to sell tickets, not to provide exclusive
access to its copyrightable descriptions of upcoming performances.'
The court here does not adequately analyze the circumvention
device at issue or explain how Ticketmaster's "CAPTCHA" system
"handshake," it is difficult to see how this might constitute circumvention in the traditional sense.
Rather, the game itself is sought permission to play on the bnetd.org server, and the server complied.
85. 5o7 F. Supp. 2d 1o96, 1102 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
86. Id. at 1102-03. CAPTCHA is an application that
presents "a box with stylized random characters partially obscured behind hash marks."
The user is required to type the characters into an entry on the screen in order to proceed
with the request. Most automated devices cannot decipher and type the random characters
and thus cannot proceed to the copyrighted ticket purchase pages.
Id. at 112 (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 1O5-O; see also MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir.
1993).

88. Ticketmaster L. L. C., 5o7 F. Supp. 2d at 1111-12. The court's interpretation of Ticketmaster's
copyright infringement claim has staggering implications. The court held that viewing plaintiff's
webpages in a browser (and thus storing a copy in RAM), consisted of making copies of those
webpages within the copyright right of reproduction. Id. Next, Ticketmaster's TOS grants a license to
users who want to view (and thus, according to the court, copy) its copyrighted pages. Id. Finally, the
court held that when users violated the terms of service and continued to navigate the webpages, it
committed copyright infringement. Id. This implies that anyone who violates a similar TOS and
continues to browse is liable for copyright infringement; a shocking proposition in the Internet age.
89. Seeid. at iI12.
9o. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 549 (6th Cir. 2004)
("Nowhere in its deliberations over the DMCA did Congress express an interest in creating liability
for the circumvention of technological measures designed to prevent consumers from using consumer
goods while leaving the copyrightable content of a work unprotected.").
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effectively protects access to the work. First, it is not clear from the facts
whether defendant's device identifies the password in the CAPTCHA
and applies it as any ordinary user would, or whether it employs some
more nefarious "hacking" tool to decrypt the correct answer. If
defendant's device simply identifies the password in the CAPTCHA and
applies it, the device's actions do not fit the definition of circumvention
under either subsection of section I20I."' Second, and perhaps more
importantly, the court ignores the Sixth Circuit Lexmark decision which
held that a device that did not actually protect or prevent anyone from
reading the copyrighted material did not effectively control access.9"
Here, the password was displayed on the lockout screen, clearly visible to
any user, and the content of the copyrighted pages behind the lockout
screen were made freely available.93 It is therefore questionable whether
the CAPTCHA device effectively protected a work under section i201.
Another flaw in the decision, as many others before it, is that the
court did not adequately examine the issue of authorization in its section
1201(a) analysis. For the purposes of the DMCA, where should the court
have looked for "authority"? The TOS explicitly said that automated
devices were prohibited, but that is a tenet of contract law, the violation
of which should not necessarily trigger revocation of authorization or
DMCA liability. 9' Moreover, the TOS applied only after the lockout
screen was passed and Ticketmaster made the password publicly
available,95 which essentially authorized anyone who could read it. While
click-wrap agreements like the TOS here are valid contracts in theory,
any user would glean an implicit authorization to use the website from
the free availability of the password. 6 Lastly, the court did not
specifically address whether a technological measure can block
automated access but not manual access and yet still be an "effective"
measure under the DMCA. Because the DMCA does not distinguish
between manual users and automated users, and because the
91.

Of course, if defendant's device does the latter, the court's DMCA analysis is largely correct.

92. See discussion supra Part III.
93. Ticketmaster L.L.C., 507 F. Supp. 2d at 105, III2.
94. See Lipton, supra note 44, at 490 ("Congress did not intend to impact significantly the usual
rules and policies relating to commercial competition in tangible goods. These rules and policies
generally are provided by contract, supplemented by legislation and case law dealing with commercial
transactions, and also regulated to a significant extent by antitrust laws."). But see Orin S. Kerr, A
Lukewarm Defense of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, in Copy FIGHTs: THE FUTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 163, 67 (Adam Thierer & Wayne Crews eds., 2002)
(stating that the goal of the DMCA is "to stop people from breaching their contracts by interfering
with the market for contract-breaching tools.... The idea is... you can help make contracts
enforceable by deterring people from making and distributing contract-breaching devices.").
95. See Ticketmaster L.L.C., 507 F. Supp. 2d at 1102, 1107, 1112.
96. See, e.g., Sprecht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F. 3 d I, 21-25 (2d Cir. 2002); ProCD, Inc.
v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449-50 (7th Cir. 1996); Ticketmaster, Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV
o
99-7654, 2000 WL 52539 , at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000).
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authorization is implicit before the TOS is accepted, and is only revoked
by contract violation after, the court's decision is incomplete. These two
decisions show why courts' varying definitions of the term
"authorization" should be revisited. The next Part will further
demonstrate why this is so.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF IMPRECISELY DEFINING "AUTHORIZATION"
IN THE DMCA
"The notion of authorization is central to understanding section
I2oI(a)."' As the preceding cases demonstrate however, courts have not
sufficiently or consistently addressed the definition of "authorization" in
their analysis of alleged DMCA violations. Similarly, because courts
have failed to consistently define it within the Computer Fraud and98
Abuse Act of 1986 ("CFAA") and other state computer fraud statutes,
it is instructive to examine proposed treatment of the term there.9
A.

THE DEFINITION OF "AUTHORIZATION"

IN THE

CFAA

CONTEXT

The CFAA addresses computer fraud, providing civil and criminal
penalties to those who, among other things, access a computer "without
authorization" or who "exceed[] authorized access" to a computer."
Common violations include "computer hacking, distribution of computer
worms and viruses, and denial-of-service attacks."'.. More so than the
DMCA, the CFAA imputes liability for the acts of trespass and fraud
that evoke a "lock and key" analogy because the crimes typically involve
a person breaking into a computer that is owned by someone else,
thereby invading his or her "property.'

In his discussion of authorization, Professor Kerr points out that
computer crimes statutes generally do not define the phrase "without
authorization,"'" and that the cases interpreting them have given varied
definitions. 4 The first of these definitions is the "intended function" test
for authorization, which states "[w]hen a user exploits weaknesses in a
program and uses a function in an unintended way to access a
computer... that access is without authorization."' 5 The second set of
cases Kerr describes adopted an agency definition of authorization
derived from the Restatement (Second) of Agency, whereby employees
97. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F. 3 d 1178, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
98. Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrimes' Scope: Interpreting "Access" and "Authorization" in Computer
Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1596, 1598 n.I1 (2003).
99. Id. at 1599.
Ioo. I8 U.S.C. § 1030 (20o6).
1O1. Kerr, supra note 98, at 16o3-04.
102. See id. at I6o9-Ii.
io3. Id. at 1623-24.
104. Id. at 1628.
1O5. Id. at 1632.
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are authorized until they begin acting as agents for someone other than
their employer."6 Kerr notes that some of these cases embody a
"strikingly broad" theory of agency, whereas other cases that also take
into account the intent of the employee to exceed access are "slightly
narrower."" The third category of authorization, according to Kerr,
involves contractual provisions. Surprisingly, at least in civil cases,
authorization is exceeded when a contract explicitly defining
authorization is breached.'" This last interpretation, as will be discussed
below, appears in the DMCA context as well, and there, as here, allows
for the possibility that "[n]early any use of a computer that is against the
interests of its owner is an 'access' ... triggering severe criminal
penalties.""
Kerr outlines two possible approaches to computer fraud and misuse
cases: define unauthorized access based either on contract or on
restrictions by code."' He then proposes a single interpretation of both
"authorization" and "access" based on the latter approach."' Essentially,
Kerr suggests a broad interpretation of the word "access," to include any
"successful interaction" within the statute,"' and a limited definition of
the phrase "without authorization" that would include only
circumvention of restrictions by code."' Kerr argues that "[b]y granting
the computer owner essentially unlimited authority to define
authorization, the contract standard delegates the scope of criminality to
every computer owner."".5 In reining in this excessive power, he attempts
to "mediate the line between
openness on the one hand, and privacy and
6
security on the other.""

io6. Id. at 1632-33 (discussing Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F.
Supp. 2d I121 (W.D. Wash. 2000)).
107. Id. at 1633-34.

io8. Id. at 1637.
to9. Id.
11o. Id. at i64O. Kerr further notes that "[c]ourts previously used harm as a proxy for theft; now

they appear to use harm as a proxy for lack of authorization." Id. at 1642.
iii. See id. at 1599-16oo.
112. Id. at 1642.
I13. Id. at 1646-47.
114. Id. at 1648-49 ("When a user circumvents regulation by code, she tricks the computer into
giving her greater privileges .... This normally can occur in two ways. First, a user can enter the
username and password of another user with greater privileges ....
Second, a user can exploit a design
flaw in software that leads the software to grant the user greater privileges ....
In contrast, when a
user breaches a regulation by contract, the user need not trick the computer: The user need only take
steps that breach a condition of the use imposed by the computer owner." (footnotes omitted)).
115. Id. at 1651. As the next section discusses, courts have similarly delegated this rulemaking
authority to copyright owners under the DMCA.
116. Id. at 1650. Similarly under the DMCA, the balance should be between protecting the rights
of the copyright owner and protecting the interests of the consumer of the copyrighted work. For in
the case of many a copyrighted work, under the DMCA the copyright owner is simultaneously selling
access and taking it away with code-based restrictions. Susan Brenner has also expressed concern
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Though Kerr contends that his advocacy of liability based on the
circumvention of a code-based restriction in the CFAA context does not
carry over into the DMCA,"7 it is instructive to consider how different
definitions of authorization might affect DMCA cases. Courts at the very
least should acknowledge the possible distinctions. While courts have
generally made the right determinations in the clearer cases, the
exceptions demonstrate that rather than explain why they have chosen to
impute a particular level of authorization, courts have often looked to
the preferences of the copyright owner to determine whether there was
authorization." 8 This lack of detailed analysis of the authorization
requirement can pose a risk to acceptable uses of devices ostensibly
allowed under the DMCA." 9 Because of the current inconsistency in
defining "authorization" under the DMCA, settling on either a broad or
narrow definition of authorization in assessing alleged circumvention
under section 1201(a) would lead to different rulings than courts have
made in many cases so far. The next two subsections illustrate this
inconsistency.
B.

THE EFFECT OF USING A PERMISSIVE DEFINITION OF AUTHORIZATION

Giving the most permissive interpretation to the term
"authorization" in section 1201(a)(3), subsections (A) and (B), and
"circumvention" in section 1201, subsections (a) and (b), would require
the reversal of many DMCA cases. On this definition, as in the
aftermarket-parts and password cases, the existence of a password or key
issued by the copyright holder would constitute authorization to access
the work behind the TPM through use of that password or key, and
would thus not constitute circumvention.

about the "criminalization" of the dissemination of information. She explains:
Posting code is a much more ambiguous act than selling the combination to a bank safe.

The DMCA criminalizes the dissemination of technical/scientific information that can be
used to compromise technology that protects copyrighted material. It criminalizes the
distribution of this information even though (a) it does not "belong" to the parties who own
the copyrights and (b) it can have expressive content, the distribution of which may
facilitate technical and scientific inquiry. The DMCA criminalizes the dissemination of the
information it encompasses on the premise that it can be used to facilitate copyright
infringement. It is a pure "burglar's tools" statute.
Susan W. Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the Dissemination of Ideas and Data Be
Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 273, 347, 403 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
117. Kerr, supra note 98, at 1651 n.239.
is8. See supra Parts I, III.
I 19. Professor Denicola notes that "superficial judicial analysis of the distinction has occurred
mostly in trafficking cases, where the difference between access and rights controls is essentially
irrelevant. The risk, of course, is that this nonchalance will spill over into circumvention cases, where
the distinction is crucial to the balance envisioned by Congress." Robert C. Denicola, Access Controls,
Rights Protection, and Circumvention: Interpreting the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to Preserve
Noninfringing Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 209, 220-21 (2o08).
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For example, for purposes of DMCA liability only (not contractual
liability), if the authorization for accessing the inner pages of
Ticketmaster's website came from the public display of the CATPCHA
password on the screen, then defendant's device in Ticketmaster would
not have circumvented the TPM. This is because the application of
information would properly encounter the TPM, not "descramble,
decrypt," etc.,'2 ° within the first criterion of section 1201(a). Even if it did,
any decryption would have been achieved with the "authority of the
copyright owner ..... Similarly, in Davidson, if the authorization to play
the videogame comes from the sale of the single-player game to
consumers, then it is improper for Blizzard to use the DMCA to prevent
the use of a portion of its game in a way Blizzard would prefer it not to
be used. This case seems similar to the aftermarket-parts cases, for recall
in Storage Technology, "courts generally have found a violation of the
DMCA only when the alleged access was intertwined with a right
protected by the Copyright Act .... Thus, even if the use of defendant's
bnet.org server to access the videogame's Battle.net multiplayer mode
was unauthorized, Davidson would be incorrect because there is no
evidence that the copyrighted material in the videogame was subject to
copying or violation of any other rights of copyright.
At the most extreme reevaluation, the DeCSS cases would require
further consideration as well. For example, according to descriptions of
DeCSS's creation, an initial key was left unencrypted' 23 The copyright
holder had legitimately issued this key.'24 The creators of DeCSS
obtained this unencrypted key and were able to guess the others, as the
password was likely guessed in Egilman.'5 Though the creators in
essence "stole" the key, this is no different from the actions of the
defendants in I.M.S. who escaped DMCA liability."6 If instead, one of
the DVD player manufacturers had given the creators of DeCSS the key,
it is possible that whatever implicit authorization was possessed by the

17 U.S.C. § 120I(a) (2o06).
Id. § 1201(a)(3).
122. 421 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
120.

121.

123. Patrizio, supra note 24 ("To descramble the video and audio, a 5-byte (40-bit) key is needed.
Every player-including consoles from Sony, Toshiba, and other consumer electronics vendors, as well
as software vendors for PCs like WinDVD and ATI DVD-has its own unique unlock key .... All
licensees of DVD technology have to encrypt their decryption key so no one can reverse-engineer the
playback software and extract the key. Well, one licensee didn't encrypt their key. The developers of
DeCSS, a Norwegian group called MoRE (Masters of Reverse Engineering) got a key by reverseengineering the XingDVD player, from Xing Technologies, a subsidiary of RealNetworks.").
124. Id.
125. Id.; see also discussion of Egilman, supra Part III.
126. See 307 F. Supp. 2d 521, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Plaintiff authorized someone else to use the
DVD player, and defendant borrowed it without plaintiff's permission. Whatever the impropriety of
defendant's conduct, the DMCA and the anti-circumvention provision at issue do not target this sort
of activity.").
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DVD manufacturer was passed on to the DeCSS makers. Then the only
thing that might arguably stand in the way is the licensing agreement
between the DVD player manufacturer and the copyright holder.
However, the Chamberlain court and other commentators have said the
DMCA should not be used to enforce these agreements.'27 Does a
copyright holder have to "authorize" every transfer of a validly-issued
password or key before its use ceases to be circumvention under the
DMCA?
In light of this discussion, it is possible to read 321 Studios as a
password case that was wrongly decided in part. There the court failed to
address three issues: (I) whether the use of an authorized "key" can
confront a TPM and not circumvent under the DMCA, (2) the definition
of "authorized by the copyright holder," and (3) that authorization by
the copyright holder does not implicate liability under section I2oI (b).
While the specific issue was not raised in 321 Studios, there are many
ways for DVD player manufacturers and other users to have obtained
the unencrypted key for CSS and use it in a way that would be consistent
with I.M.S. The question is, can a more technologically sophisticated key
be held to properly confront a measure such that it does not circumvent,
like a password can? Both password and keys are used to "unlock"
TPMs. They are arguably the same. Unfortunately, neither Congress nor
the courts have articulated the crucial distinction between a password
(typically typed by a human), and an automated or software-based
"handshake" key.
Another argument is that the different decisions reflect how courts
look to the attendant conduct to decide whether the use was allowable.
For example, in Egilman, the plaintiff did not accuse the defendant of
depriving him of a sale or of infringing upon his right of distribution.
Indeed, plaintiff was not offering the information for sale; it was kept on
his own website for academic dissemination and he clearly preferred to
keep it secret.2" Therefore, the conduct was more akin to computer

fraud, thereby not implicating the DMCA as heavily as in a case like
Corley, where it was shown that the makers of DeCSS were encouraging
copyright infringement.29

The second issue with 321 Studios surrounds the meaning of
"authorized by the copyright holder." The DMCA does not define
"authorization," and the court in 321 Studios does not address it.
Plaintiffs essentially claimed defendants did not have "authority"
because they did not license the player key through the proper
127. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("What
the law authorizes, Chamberlain cannot revoke."); Reichman et al., supra note 4, at 1028.
128. Egilman v. Keller & Heckman, LLP, 401 F. Supp. 2d 105, io8 (D.D.C. 2005).
129. 273 F.3 d 429,439 (2d Cir. 2001).
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channels.'30 Giving effect to the 321 Studios construction of section 1201
would imply, in a way not contemplated by Congress, that the owner of a
DVD needs authorization to use the DVD, because use requires
decryption. For example, imagine that a DVD manufacturer not in a
license agreement with the copyright holder obtains a valid key from
another manufacturer and uses it in its player.'3' It would be nonsensical
to hold the owner of a legitimately purchased DVD liable for
circumventing section I20I(a) because he or she used the player, simply
because the player did not have a contract with the copyright holder. As
commentators have noted, there are considerable antitrust concerns
implicated when copyright owners are able to dictate all of the
downstream uses of their works, as well as the media upon which it is
stored.3
The third and final problem with the 321 Studios decision is the
reference to authorization in the court's assessment of section I20I(b)
liability. Under section 120I(b) of the DMCA, "to 'circumvent
protection afforded by a technological measure' means avoiding,
bypassing, removing, deactivating, or otherwise impairing a technological
measure."' 33 The court in 321 Studios erroneously dismisses, without
discussion, the fact that this definition does not state that lack of
authorization from the copyright holder will trigger liability. Unlike
provisions of section 120I(a) that govern "access," section 120I(b) is
intended to address technological protection of the rights afforded by the
Copyright Act and only addresses devices made to circumvent them.
Thus, circumvention is only committed within the meaning of section
120I(b) by avoiding bypassing, removing, deactivating, or otherwise
impairing.'34 Therefore, if the player key is a valid "password" authorized
by the copyright holder, according to LM.S. and Egilman the application
of said key would not constitute circumvention under section 1201(b)
because it would properly confront the TPM, not circumvent it.'
In contrast, the 321 Studios court simply stated that, "while 321'S
software does use the authorized key to access the DVD, it does not have
authority to use this key, as licensed DVD players do, and it therefore
130. 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d lO85, 1094-95 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
131. Also assume that the player does not enable copying, so as not to run afoul of the provisions
of section I2oi(b).
132. Reichman et al., supra note 4, at 1028.
133. 17 U.S.C. § I2oI(b)(2)(A) (2006).

134. Reichman et al., supra note 4, at 1028.
135. See Egilman v. Keller & Heckman, LLP, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1O5, 113 (D.D.C. 2oo5) ("[Ulsing a
username/password combination as intended-by entering a valid username and password, albeit
without authorization-does not constitute circumvention under the DMCA."); I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt.
Sys. v. Berkshire Info. Sys., 3o7 F. Supp. 2d 521, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that "defendant is not
said to have avoided or bypassed the deployed technological measure in the measure's gatekeeping
capacity").
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avoids and bypasses CSS. ' ' 3 6 With this, the court attempts to separate the
authorization of the key from the authorization of the actor.
Furthermore, it uses the definition of circumvention from section 1201 (a)
to impute liability under section 1201(b). While the defendant here might
be liable under section 1201(a) if its use of the key was not authorized
(leaving aside for a moment what constitutes the authorization of the
copyright holder), section 1201(b) is drafted differently. As opposed to
section 1201(a), section 1201(b) does not mention authorization at all, so
the lack of it alone cannot constitute circumvention under that section.'37
Under section 120I(b), if defendants are using an authorized key in the
manner intended, such that their conduct does not constitute "avoiding,
bypassing, removing, deactivating, or otherwise impairing," following the
LM.S. standard, it should not matter whether or not they were
authorized. 131
C.

THE EFFECT OF USING A RESTRICTIVE DEFINITION OF AUTHORIZATION

While defaulting to a permissive definition of "authorization" may
not make sense in all contexts, there are policy and common sense
reasons for not applying a restrictive definition, and for not allowing the
"avoid, bypass" terminology in section 1201(a) to reach all cases.
Scholars have argued that it would be "absurd and disastrous" to
construe section I201(a) as being "concerned only with control over
access, and not with rights protected by copyright law," because:
It would "allow any manufacturer of any product to add a single
copyrighted sentence or software fragment to its product, wrap the
copyrighted material in a trivial 'encryption' scheme, and thereby gain
the right to restrict consumers' rights to use its products in conjunction
with competing products." This would "allow virtually any company to
attempt to leverage its sales into aftermarket monopolies," even
though this would be unlawful under the antitrust laws and the
copyright misuse doctrine.'39

As Professor Kerr asks in the CFAA context, "who and what determines
whether access is authorized ....
Can a computer owner set the scope of
authorization by contractual language? Or do these standards derive
from the social norms of Internet users?"'40 As the alternative outcomes
of the following cases will demonstrate, requiring express authorization

136. 307 F. Supp. 2d I085, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
137. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A) (defining circumvention as certain actions "without the

authority the copyright owner"), with id. § 120I(b)(2)(A) (defining circumvention without any such
authorization element).
138. Id. § 1201(b)(2)(A).
139. Reichman et al., supra note 4, at 1028 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Chamberlain Group, Inc.
v. Skylink Techs.. Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
140. Kerr, supra note 98, at 1623.

May 20091

A CALL FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE DMCA

from the copyright holder would not always be feasible, desirable, or
possible.
The decisions in LM.S. and Egilman might not have come out
differently under a narrow, express authorization requirement, because
both courts found that the actions of the defendants did not meet the
first part of section 1201(a)(3)(A), namely that the application of the
passwords did not descramble, decrypt, avoid, bypass, remove,
deactivate, or impair the TPM.' 4 ' However, if the courts had determined
that the defendants' actions were "deactivations" of the measures, the
next question would be whether defendants' use of the valid password
was "authorized." If not, the plaintiffs in these cases would probably
have succeeded on their DMCA claims.
Consider, also, the aftermarket-parts cases. If the Federal Circuit in
Chamberlainand Storage Technology had held that the plaintiffs had not
given authorization to access the copyrighted material in garage door
openers and data storage libraries, the kind of monopolies the court
suggested might result. This would have further rippling effects as more
and more devices are embedded with copyrightable software program,
and the fears of widespread use of "trivial encryption schemes" and
unintended monopolies described by the scholars quoted above would be
realized.
Finally, decisions in cases like Ticketmaster and Davidson would
become more common in areas further and further divorced from the
purposes of copyright law or the DMCA. As discussed above, the
Ticketmaster decision has surprising implications because it allows
copyright holders to appear to make their work available while imposing
virtually any condition upon that access. This is hardly the benefit to
society that the Copyright Act envisions providing. It further makes
merely browsing the Internet in certain contexts a violation of copyright
law.'42 Companies like the plaintiff in Davidson would continue to be
able to control the downstream use of software like videogames, even
after they obtain the benefit of the sale.
As these cases illustrate, various problems arise if we require express
authorization from the copyright holder. First, although the DMCA has
existed for over a decade now, consumers are still accustomed to being
able to do what they want with items they have rightfully purchased. The
First Sale Doctrine is firmly rooted in our collective consciousness, as
partially demonstrated by the resistance to digital rights management
programs in legally purchased copies of copyrighted works.'43 "As the
141. See supra notes 60, 66 and accompanying text.
142. See generally Matt Jackson, Using Technology to Circumvent the Law: The DMCA's Push to
Privatize Copyright, 23 HASTINGS CoMM. &Er. L.J. 607 (2ooi).
143. For example, this is seen in cases that deal with regional coding on video games and DVDs.
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Chamberlain and Lexmark cases both demonstrate, consumers and
commercial competitors may have very different normative expectations
from an original product manufacturer about what conduct is
appropriate with respect to the product in an after-market context."'"
Moreover, Professor Lipton notes the "increasing judicial concerns about
protecting
the
reasonable
expectations
of
the
average
consumer .... Surely consumers must have an implicit right to buy a
product that will enable them to utilize their garage door openers."' 45
While this argument is only made explicit in the aftermarket-parts
context, it seems correct that the "reasonable expectations of the average
consumer" should be respected in other contexts too. To use the DMCA
to forbid people to share what they have legally purchased with their
family or friends is an affront to this principle.
It is also important to recall the Federal Circuit's holding in Storage
Technology, which reiterated that because the DMCA is intended to
help protect rights of copyright, and not of contract, the DMCA should
not be used to enforce contractual restrictions."46 Furthermore in
Chamberlain, the court noted the need to avoid a construction of the
DMCA that would "allow any copyright owner, through a combination
of contractual terms and technological measures, to repeal the fair use
doctrine with respect to an individual copyrighted work."' 47 Otherwise,
copyright holders can enforce their will, through increasingly
complicated licenses and technological measures, and have it supported
by the DMCA. This is precisely what will occur, however, if the
authorization prong is interpreted in this narrow fashion.

See Denicola, supra note I i9, at 224-25 ("A district court issued a preliminary injunction against the
sale of a device that circumvented similar regional coding used by Sony on its PlayStation video
games, holding that regional coding was an access control. This too seems wrong.... [O]wners of
regionally-coded games have authorized access to the entire copyrighted expression contained in their
copy. Unlike CSS, regional coding... does nothing to inhibit the copying of games or DVDs.
Copyright owners might argue that the coding assists in protecting their exclusive right 'to distribute
copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public.' However, only a 'technological
measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title' is entitled to protection
under § i2oi(b). The 'first sale' doctrine in § io9 of the Copyright Act grants the owner of a lawfully
made copy of a copyrighted work the right to sell or otherwise dispose of possession of that copy.
Thus, the Copyright Act does not give the movie studios the right to control the subsequent
redistribution of lawfully made DVDs, and hence a technological attempt to safeguard that interest
does protect a right of the copyright owner under Title 17. Neither the anti-circumvention nor the antitrafficking rules would then be applicable to regional coding." (footnotes omitted)).
144. Lipton, supra note 44, at 554.
145. Id.
146. See 421 F.3 d 1307, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("The activation of the maintenance code may violate
[Storage Technology's] contractual rights vis-A-vis its customers, but those rights are not the rights
protected by copyright law. There is simply not a sufficient nexus between the rights protected by
copyright law and the circumvention of the GetKey system.").
147. 381 F.3d 1178, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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Another problem with enforcing an express authorization
requirement and broad definition of circumvention is that
"today... everything is protected by copyright and it is almost
impossible to figure out whom to ask for permission."'' 4 Thus, it is
impossible to know whom to ask for authorization to share one's
password, DVD player key, etc., or to circumvent a rights control device
for a fair use purpose. Additionally, even if one knew where to seek
authorization, there is no guarantee copyright holders will grant it. This
is especially true in cases where they perceive a risk to their own
interests, even if copyright law would condone the desired use or access
in the absence of the DMCA. 49 For example, "[b]y using TPMs,
copyright owners arguably gain the power to opt out of those parts of the
copyright system they dislike. They can not only design TPMs to
circumvent public interest uses, but can claim shelter behind section 1201
for doing so.""' Furthermore, "there is as yet no incentive for copyright
owners or TPM vendors to fine-tune TPMs to enable non-infringing
uses.' 5 ' The Chamberlain, Storage Technology, and Lexmark cases
demonstrate attempts to corner markets that Congress did not intend to
protect. Additionally, Professor Reese has noted the increasing
popularity of TPMs that "merge" access and rights controls, giving
copyright owners the extra protection of the authorization component of
section 1201(a), even in a rights control situation.'52 The danger here is
that "copyright owners can use these technological measures not only to
prevent infringement, but also to avoid the limitations that copyright law
places on their monopoly privilege."'53 Therefore, in the absence of a
clear enough definition of authorization in these gray area cases, it
behooves courts to apply the DMCA circumvention terms carefully
rather than go beyond the intent of Congress to the detriment of
consumers and fair use.
An additional risk of restrictively interpreting the term
"authorization" is that it will stifle the newsgathering process or restrict
access to material that a user is actually entitled to see. This risk has
already manifested itself at least one instance. In 2002, reporter Declan

148.
149.
15o.
151.

Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. I,

22 (2004).

See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, § 12A.o6(C)(2)(c); see also Burk, supra note i, at 1io6.
Reichman et al., supra note 4, at 1023.
Id.
152. See Reese, supra note 4, at 621 ("Copyright owners may instead be able to employ
technological protection systems that incorporate both an access control and a rights control. So far,
courts have treated such 'merged' control measures as entitled to the legal protections of both accessand rights-control measures, even when the system was essentially directed only at preventing copying
and distribution, rather than at controlling access.... The deployment of merged control measures
thus poses a threat to the congressional scheme for balancing protections for copyright owners against
the public's interest in noninfringing use.").
153. Jackson, supra note 142, at 615.
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McCullagh obtained the username and password to a government
website that purported to contain information about airport security
procedures and the relationship between federal and local police.'54
Because the information claimed to be "restricted to airport
management and local law enforcement," McCullagh feared prosecution
from using the legitimate password given to him by someone else.'55
Fortunately, the cases that address the application of manual
passwords, LM.S. and Egilman, have shown that McCullagh's actions
would not likely be considered circumvention. But cases like Davidson
imply they might, if the original recipient has agreed to some contractual
restriction against sharing. There is a danger if the commentators who
disagree with the LM.S. line of cases have their way. Letting courts use
DMCA liability to enforce contractual provisions, rather than enforcing
the provisions themselves, enables copyright owners to extract greater
civil penalties, and in some instances impose criminal liability, where
contract law would not otherwise provide such a remedy. s6 "[T]he
DMCA's operation should be restricted to disputes that are really about
digital copyright piracy.""'
V.

PROPOSED REMEDY

What all of the cases above illustrate is that a failure to clearly define
authorization has resulted in confusion and inconsistency. Restrictive
interpretation of the circumvention provision, especially the term
"authorization," leads to illogical case law and possibly unfair outcomes.
Thus Congress or the courts should better define what constitutes
"authorization" under sections 1201(a)(3)(A) and I20I(a)(3)(B) of the
DMCA, and clarify how this differs from the definition of circumvention
under section 1201(b), in order to more clearly demarcate what conduct
is permitted and what is forbidden. I,8 Otherwise, as the aftermarket-parts
cases demonstrate, plaintiffs may claim lack of authorization when
someone does something with their work that they simply dislike.'59 Or,
154. Declan McCullagh, Perspective: Will This Land Me in Jail?, CNET NEWS, Dec. 23, 2002,
http://www.news.com/2oio-io28-978636.html.
155. Id.
156. Cf. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
("Under Chamberlain's proposed construction ... disabling a burglar alarm to gain 'access' to a home
containing copyrighted books, music, art, and periodicals would violate the DMCA; anyone who did
so would unquestionably have 'circumvented a technological measure that effectively controls access
to a work protected under [the Copyright Act].' The appropriate deterrents to this type of behavior lie
in tort law and criminal law, not in copyright law.").
157. Lipton, supra note 44, at 515 .
158. See 17 U.S.C. § 120I(a)(3)(A)-(B), (b) (2006).
159. As Professor Ginsburg notes, copyright holders have already made a bad name for
themselves, and are as equally guilty of hyperbole as the "information wants to be free" set through
gambits such as the "over-depiction of 'piracy' as the unauthorized copying by end-users," which "not
only distorts but trivializes the term." Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26
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conversely, courts like the one in 321 Studios may continue to conflate
the issue of authorization with circumvention and possible interference
with the rights of the copyright holder, granting more protection to the
traditional rights of copyright than Congress intended.'

There are many ways to reword the statute to make it easier to
apply, while hewing to the original purpose of the DMCA. For example,
Professor Samuelson has advocated adding the phrase "or other

legitimate purposes" to the anti-circumvention provisions in section6

12o1(a)(3)(A) to add "flexibility, adaptability, and fairness to the law.' ,
This would have the added benefit of more closely mimicking the
flexibility of the exceptions of the Copyright Act, because, as she notes,6
there are in fact legitimate reasons for bypassing access controls. 2
Alternatively, Nimmer on Copyright advocates replacing "without the
authority of the copyright holder" in section 12I(a)(3)(A) with "unless
the person who engages in that conduct has been authorized by the
copyright owner to descramble, decrypt, or otherwise to avoid, bypass,
remove, deactivate, or impair the technological measure on that work."' 63
Because of the ambiguity in the current wording, this change would
"follow the chief legislative goal underlying this amendment: augmenting
the rights of copyright owners without contributing to a pay-per-use
world. ,"6

4

It is easy to argue that stealing or using stolen passwords might be a
violation of the statute, but the few cases that have addressed it hold
otherwise. 6' A more complicated question arises when passwords are
borrowed or shared. 166 If 7I share my password with someone, is that a
violation of the DMCA?' Should it be? What if I forget my password?

61, 63 (2002).
16o. See discussion of 321 Studios's analysis of § 121o(b), supra Part IV.
161. Pamela Samuelson, Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 546 (1999).
162. Id.
163. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, § I2A.o6(D)(2). Nimmer notes that this is one of two
alternative interpretations of "without the authorization of the copyright owner" in § I2oI(a)(3)(A).
The other, "in any manner other than one that the copyright owner has authorized that person to
undertake" is much more restrictive and would capture a person "whenever he acts in a manner of
which the copyright owner has not approved in advance." Id.
164. Id.
i65. This kind of action is probably more appropriately pursued under a fraud regime such as the
CFAA. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2oo6).
166. Litman, supra note 148, at 5 (discussing in the Internet context that "[s]omeone knows what I
want to know. Someone has the information I want. If I can find her, I can learn it from her. She will
share it with me."); see also id. at 8 ("[P]eople like to look things up, and they want to share.").
167. Though IM.S. concluded the answer is no, Professor Ginsburg disagrees: "Entry of the
password 'deactivates' the measure that restricts access; if the password is employed by an
unauthorized user, then the deactivation will not have occurred with the copyright owner's authority."
Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 27-28 (citations omitted); see also Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 140 (arguing
that a stricter definition probably applies: "in theory.... I cannot communicate my password to a
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
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One group of scholars has suggested that "courts could decide that
persistent access controls, such as CSS, are not the kinds of 'access
controls' that section 1201(a) actually regulates," because CSS is
primarily a copy control device that is governed by section I2oI(b).'6
This would open up considerably more room for fair use
circumventions. 6 "[Courts] could also find in section 120I(c)(I) a
statutory basis for excusing fair use circumventions."'' 0 Perhaps password
sharing should be a fair use exception to sectioni2o(a)(i).
Another possibility is to incorporate some of the language of
authorization from section 117 of the Copyright Act, which states that "it
is not an infringement for the owner or lessee of a machine to make or
authorize the making of a copy of a computer program" in certain
circumstances having to do with maintenance or repair, and under
certain conditions, such as requiring the copy to be destroyed when the
work is completed. " ' Similarly, if a consumer has legitimately purchased
the rights to use a copyright work, there should be some circumstances
where that person can share any necessary password or key with others
in a way that "authorizes" the recipient of the password to use it without
any DMCA circumvention liability. Professor Reese gives a plausible
example:
What of a device that allows a person to take a DVD "tethered" to her
home DVD player and play it on a different DVD player in a friend's
home? Arguably, that device has the use of circumventing a
technological measure that interferes with lawful activity-privately
performing a copyrighted motion picture-rather than (or in addition
to) circumventing a technological measure that protects a right of the
copyright owner.
Even DMCA supporters acknowledge that "fairness may depend on the
nature of the access control: what is the copyright owner seeking to
prohibit? In theory, access controls are designed to protect a business
model based on price discrimination according to intensity of use."'73
Thus, at the very least in the case of an unlimited-use purchase,
circumvention should be permissible.
Perhaps the best solution, then, is for all courts to adopt the
reasoning of the Federal Circuit in demanding a "nexus" between the
DMCA and actual copyright infringement, because it gives a "framework
T

friend or family member to play the game on my computer, since the password protects access to the
work, and my disclosure of the password is an act that circumvents a protective measure that had
limited access to me").
168. Reichman et al., supra note 4, at ioo8.
169. Id.
170. Id. at IOO9.
171. 17 U.S.C. § I57(c) (2oo6).
172. Reese, supra note 4, at 630.
173. Ginsburg, supra note i, at 130.
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for interpreting section 1201 that enables courts to develop a balanced
approach to interpretation of the DMCA's anti-circumvention rules
insofar as copyright owners try to use them to block fair and other noninfringing uses of technically protected copyrighted works."" 4 A more
nuanced rule would answer the concerns of commentators who contend
that an access right is necessary to promote the availability of
copyrighted works in digital form. This rule would state that the DMCA
is only inapplicable in cases where "circumvention of an access control
measure neither substitutes for purchase of the protected work nor
creates risk of copyright infringement.""' 5 Thus, circumvention to avoid
paying for access to the copyrighted work would still be forbidden, but
gaining repeat access to a work once legitimately purchased, perhaps to
experience it on a variety of platforms (and possibly
6 including a "fair
use" of sharing one's password) would be permitted.1
A final, helpful clarification would be for Congress to clarify the
distinction between human and computer actors, if they intended one to
exist. Courts like the one in LM.S. have held that the entry of a password
manually by a human generally does not circumvent, though
commentators have disagreed. 77 Conversely, the Ticketmaster court held
that the plaintiff website could discriminate between human and
T
computer actors, imputing DMCA liability to one but not the other. 7
But the DMCA does not state whether humans and software code or
computers created by humans should be treated differently or similarly.
If Ticketmaster is allowed to forbid computers from using its site but not
people, or if a software "key" is different from a manually applied
''password," Congress should explain the distinctions.
CONCLUSION

"As intellectual property is implicated increasingly in relevant
disputes, particularly in the context of detailed intellectual property
licenses purporting to impose restrictions on licensees, it becomes

174. Reichman et al., supra note 4, at 1032. The aftermarkets parts cases are the one area where
courts have engaged in sufficient discussion of authorization. For example, the Chamberlain court
stated that:
The plain language of the statute ... requires a plaintiff alleging circumvention (or
trafficking) to prove that the defendant's access was unauthorized-a significant burden
where, as here, the copyright laws authorize consumers to use the copy of Chamberlain's
software embedded in the GDOs that they purchased. The premise ... is that the copyright
laws authorize members of the public to access a work, but not to copy it.... [P]laintiffs
must prove unauthorized access.
381 F.3d 1178, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
175. Denicola, supra note 119, at 23I.
176. See, e.g., Reese, supra note 4, at 66o n.131; Samuelson, supra note 4, at 539.
177. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 3.
178. See 507 F. Supp. 2d 1O96, 1102, 1112 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
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'
imperative that we resolve some of these confusions."179
Granted, so
many words are used to describe the definition of "circumvention" in
section 1201 because it is a difficult concept to capture, and the ways in
which people use technology are constantly evolving. However, Congress
should now strive to apply the improved vocabulary that has developed
over the past ten years since the original passage of the DMCA to
describe what new rights it actually intends copyright owners to have in
the digital age. Any new definition should carefully consider the logical
consequences of stretching the definition of "authorization" too far in
either direction. Without a coherent scheme, it becomes too easy for
people to unintentionally violate the DMCA, and too easy for copyright
holders to enforce their will in ways that do not further the goals of
copyright law.

179. Lipton, supra note 44, at 513.

